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Galileo proposed what has been called a proto-inertial principle, according to which a
body in horizontal motion will conserve its motion. This statement is only true in coun-
terfactual circumstances where no impediments are present. This article analyzes how
Galileo could have been justiﬁed in ascribing deﬁnite properties to this idealized motion.
This analysis is then used to better understand the relation of Galileo’s proto-inertial
principle to the classical inertial principle.1. Introduction. Galileo Galilei assumed that a body in horizontal motion
will conserve its motion indeﬁnitely. He used this idea to explain the para-
bolic shape of a body projected from a horizontal table, and it is crucially
related to his use of relativity arguments to defuse objections to the possi-
bility of a moving earth. In both roles it functions similarly to an inertial prin-
ciple, but there are also some crucial factors that put it at a distance (for some
earlier discussions and further references, see Coffa [1968], Chalmers [1993],
Hooper [1998], and esp. Roux [2006]). Most importantly, because the notion
of the “horizontal” is underspeciﬁed if not related to a broader spatial frame-
work, Galileo’s own writings seem to use the idea in a way in which the rel-
evantmotion is both rectilinear and circular (for a recent discussion, seeMiller
[2014], 110–46). Even if interpreted as rectilinear, the restriction to horizontal
motion is highly signiﬁcant—Galileo never came to terms with the case of a
body projected along an oblique direction, such as a typical cannon ball (see
Damerow et al. 2004, 216–23, 263–66).
Galileo’s way of arguing for this conservation is closely related to a prin-
ciple that had been enunciated a number of times by earlier writers: that a*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy and Moral Science,
Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium; e-mail: maarten.vandyck
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All ubody on the horizontal can be put in motion by a minimal force (see Festa and
Roux 2006). Clearly, this minimal force conclusion only holds if we assume
an idealized situation inwhich there are no impediments tomotion.Yet, taking
this idealizing step is in itself not sufﬁcient to decide the further question
whether the motion once initiated will last or come to an end. After all, what
kind of empirical information could we conceivably possess about that kind
of counterfactual situation? In section 2, I sharpen this question by consider-
ing the case of Simon Stevin, one of the authors who had already come to the
minimal force conclusion. Stevin is especially interesting because he also
enunciated views on the conditions for acceptable idealizations, which im-
plied a sharp distinction between stating the minimal force conclusion (ac-
ceptable idealization) and possible extrapolations about the resulting motion
(unacceptable idealization). In section 3, I reconstruct howGalileo could have
felt entitled to ascribe a deﬁnite nature to the resulting motion without neces-
sarily transgressing the spirit of Stevin’s norms on acceptable idealizations. In
the concluding section 4, I show how this background helps us to better un-
derstand the relation of Galileo’s “proto-inertial” principle to the classical in-
ertial principle.
In this short article I focus on just one question regarding idealization in
thework of earlymodern practicalmathematicians such as Stevin andGalileo:
how to legitimately ascribe deﬁnite properties to idealized systems.And I only
do this with respect to one very speciﬁc problem:What can we say about hor-
izontal motion in the absence of impediments? Galileo has more to say on is-
sues regarding idealization than can be taken into account here, but a full anal-
ysis must await another occasion (see Koertge [1977] and McMullin [1985]
for two inﬂuential earlier treatments and Palmerino [2016] for a recent discus-
sion). A similar remark must be made regarding Galileo’s proto-inertial prin-
ciple: I approach this primarily through its role in Galileo’s mathematical sci-
ence of motion, bracketing its role in his astronomical work.
2. Simon Stevin on Idealization. Simon Stevin is in the ﬁrst place remem-
bered for his ingenious proof of the general condition characterizing the
equilibrium of bodies on an inclined plane, published in 1586 (see Van Dyck
[2017] for a recent analysis). He introduced the minimal force conclusion as
one of the corollaries following from this general condition: in the case of
zero inclination there can never be equilibrium between a body on the plane
and another body attached to it with a pulley, nomatter how small the second
body. Hence, “mathematically speaking” the latter body will always pull the
ﬁrst body along the horizon (Stevin 1955, 187). Stevin’s stress that the min-
imal force conclusion is only true when speaking “mathematically” is closely
related to his distinction between “speculation” and “practice.”The former is
characterized by Stevin as “an imaginary operation without natural matter,”
whereas the latter “is an operation which essentially takes place with naturalThis content downloaded from 157.193.149.185 on December 17, 2018 06:50:48 AM
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IDEALIZATION AND GALILEO’S PROTO-INERTIAL PRINCIPLE 921matter” (1961, 619). Strictly speaking, a speculatively established proposi-
tion will never be true of material objects, but “the false is admitted in order
that the truthful may be learned therefrom” (Stevin 1955, 227).
This brings Stevin very close to recent philosophical discussions on ide-
alization, where idealization is usually understood as the practice of enter-
taining false propositions in order to learn something about empirical phe-
nomena (see Weisberg [2007] for an inﬂuential discussion). But under
which conditions can the false teach us something relevant? The following
characterization helps us understand Stevin’s point of view: “The conclu-
sion of speculative propositions is perfect, but that of practical propositions
is imperfect. . . . The property and the end of speculation is that it furnishes a
sure foundation for the method of construction in practice, in which by closer
and more painstaking care one may get as near to the perfection of the spec-
ulation as the purpose of the matter requires for the beneﬁt of man” (1961,
619).1
The reason why we idealize is that it allows us to give a “perfect,” math-
ematically structured treatment of the subject matter. In the case of mechan-
ics, this mathematical treatment is made possible by the assumption that
each body possesses a unique center of gravity, which grounds the Archi-
medean proof of the law of the lever. All further mathematical propositions
in Stevin’s treatise are based on the law of the lever, which implies that the
relevance of these idealized statements indirectly depends on the existence
of a center of gravity in each body (see Van Dyck 2017, 23–24). It is this
presumed existence that provides the bridge between the speculative prop-
ositions of Stevin’s Art of Weighing and the practical operations in his Prac-
tice of Weighing. In the second proposition of the latter book, Stevin ex-
plains how to construct a “most perfect” (1955, 303) material balance that
exhibits indifferent equilibrium—which shows that this body indeed pos-
sesses a center of gravity (the possibility of indifferent equilibrium follows
directly from the deﬁnition of center of gravity as given by Stevin).
The idealized propositions are strictly speaking false, but we can con-
struct material objects such as a balance in indifferent equilibrium that ex-
hibit the deﬁning characteristics responsible for the mathematical regulari-
ties. This guarantees that by “closer and more painstaking care” we should
always be able to ﬁnd situations for which these propositions are approxi-
mately true and that we can also assume that they remain informative for
objects in situations in which the approximation no longer holds. We can
now suppose that these objects also have a center of gravity and that all dif-
ferences from the mathematically proven propositions must be ascribed to
the presence of material impediments. This will especially happen as soon1. I have slightly altered the translation.
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All uas we consider mechanical instruments that are put into motion to achieve
practical work:se subBecause in several propositions of the Practice of Weighing the motions of
bodies will be dealt with, I thought it advisable, before coming to the mat-
ter, to explain something of it to the reader. To wit, that the Art of Weighing
only teaches us to bring the moving body into equality of apparent weight to
the body to be moved. As to the additional weight or the force which the
moving body requires in order to set in motion the body to be moved (which
weight or force has to overcome the impediments of the body to be moved,
which is an inseparable attribute of every body to be moved), the Art of
Weighing does not teach us to ﬁnd that weight or force mathematically;
the cause of this is that the one moved body and its impediment are not pro-
portional to the other moved body and its impediment. (Stevin 1955, 297)“Mathematically speaking” the smallest addition of weight should sufﬁce to
put a balance in equilibrium inmotion, but practically speaking an extra force
will always be needed, the magnitude of which can only be empirically de-
termined.
Notice the parenthetical statement in the quotation: “impediments of the
body to be moved” are called “an inseparable attribute of every body to be
moved.” In an earlier text, Stevin had already deﬁned an inseparable attri-
bute as “that which cannot be taken away from its subject without the demise
of the thing” (1585, 21). But this implies the impossibility of an idealized
treatment of motion along the lines of the treatment given of equilibrium.
We cannot separate the effects of the impediments in an “imaginary opera-
tion,” as we could do for the effects of material imperfections when proving
the law of the lever. The question what would happen with the body after it is
put into motion by a minimal force on a frictionless horizontal (and assum-
ing no air resistance) must accordingly be senseless for Stevin, and, indeed,
he does remain silent about the issue. But why is this the case?
As Stevin did not rule out the possibility of a vacuum (1585, 142–49), this
cannot be due to a purely conceptual fact about the nature of motion (as it
arguably would have been for Aristotle). The clue to a better answer is to
be found in the contrast with equilibrium. All material instruments will ex-
hibit some friction (which will actually be a factor sustaining equilibrium),
but these impediments are not necessary to conceive a body in equilibrium.
We can legitimately attribute equilibrium to an idealized body, based solely
on the relative position of the body’s center of gravity to the body’s support.
Why “legitimately”? Because we have found out through careful manipula-
tion and conceptual exploration that the concept of center of gravity de-
scribes a property responsible for the behavior of all bodies. This property
has something of a dual nature: it is empirically grounded and it is a neces-This content downloaded from 157.193.149.185 on December 17, 2018 06:50:48 AM
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IDEALIZATION AND GALILEO’S PROTO-INERTIAL PRINCIPLE 923sary precondition for the possibility of giving a mathematical treatment of
this behavior. It is thus not just empty gesturing to talk about the mathemat-
ically well-determined behavior of bodies in the absence of impediments
when it comes to their static properties. The empirical relevance of Stevin’s
speculative treatise is guaranteed by the possibility of empirically exhibiting
some of its most basic assumptions.
The same move cannot be made when it comes to motion. Stevin simply
knew of no empirically grounded way to separate what we could call the
pure phenomenon, present both in the ideal and empirical situations, and
the extra factors that mask this phenomenon in most empirical situations.
There is no privileged empirical system that can play the role of a balance
in indifferent equilibrium. (Stevin further illustrates this in an appendix to
his treatises on the Art of Weighing and the Practice of Weighing, in which
he discusses bodies in free fall; see Van Dyck 2017, 33–35.) Stevin articu-
lates a clear norm for mechanical speculation: the idealizing imaginary op-
eration that is at the basis of its mathematical demonstrations must be con-
strained by the results of speciﬁc material operations if it is to be of any
epistemic worth.
3. Galileo on Motion on the Horizontal. In what follows, I compare Ga-
lileo and Stevin on the question of motion on a horizontal plane, as a way to
bring Galileo’s own use of idealization into better focus. We will see that in
a ﬁrst phase of his career, Galileo did not feel bound by something like the
norm that Stevin upheld for legitimate speculation. In a later phase, he came
to conclusions that can be underwritten by this norm, though, and we will
see how the probable discovery process also shows Galileo implicitly oper-
ating according to it. In the next section, we then analyze Galileo’s own ex-
plicit way of legitimizing his conclusions. The analysis given here has a
rather narrow epistemological focus: How does Galileo’s statement about
the conservation of motion relate to the empirical evidence at his disposal?
Ideally, this analysis should be integrated within a fuller historical and con-
textualizing description. (It is, e.g., improbable that Galileo would have known
Stevin’swork, but hewas deﬁnitely familiarwith that ofGuidobaldo delMonte,
which argues for closely related views, although not linking these to the ques-
tion of motion on the horizontal [see Van Dyck 2017].)
In his youthful manuscript De Motu Antiquiora, written in 1589–92, a
few years after Stevin’s treatises, Galileo also deduced the general condition
characterizing equilibrium on an inclined plane and inferred the minimal
force conclusion from it (Galilei 1890, 1:296–302). Again like Stevin, Ga-
lileo went on to warn his readers not to expect this conclusion to be borne
out when experimenting with material bodies. But unlike Stevin, Galileo
was also interested in the nature of the resulting motion. More speciﬁcally,
he wondered how to characterize it in terms of the conceptual frameworkThis content downloaded from 157.193.149.185 on December 17, 2018 06:50:48 AM
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All uinherited from Aristotle, in which motions are either natural or forced. Ga-
lileo’s tentative conclusion was that it is probably best to characterize it as
neither natural (since the body is not moving toward its natural place, which
is why the motion will not start spontaneously) nor forced (since it is not
moving away from its natural place, which is why a minimal force will suf-
ﬁce to move it) but “neutral.” In the same treatise, Galileo also considered
the similar case of a perfectly homogeneous material sphere rotating around
the center of the universe: Would its “neutral”motion last or come to an end
(Galilei 1890, 1:306–7)? Signiﬁcantly, Galileo raised the question but never
answered it in his treatise. We can easily understand why Galileo would
have to remain undecided. On the one hand, there is no reason why the body
should stop once it is put into motion—after all, it has no resistance against
this motion. On the other hand, there is no reason why the body should stay
in motion—after all, it has no inclination for this motion (and according to
the view that Galileo had already defended in his treatise, an external force
that puts a body into motion will only remain present in that body for a lim-
ited amount of time).
Galileo’s silence on the question of conservation of motion on a horizon-
tal plane is of a nature very different from Stevin’s. When, for example,
treating free fall, Galileo saw no problem in assuming the pure phenomenon
to be one in which the bodies fall with uniform speeds measured by (some-
thing like) their speciﬁc weight, even if there is no empirical operation that
can show this phenomenon to be approximately exhibited by material bod-
ies. Accordingly, he saw no problem in separating a pure phenomenon from
impediments solely on the basis of theoretical preconceptions (in this case
based in an extrapolation from Archimedean hydrostatics). It is accordingly
only the gap in his theoretical framework that stopped Galileo from giving a
deﬁnite statement on the precise nature of the counterfactual motion of a
body moving without impediments on a perfectly horizontal plane: there
seem to be equally good theoretical reasons to assume that it would remain
in motion and that it would stop.
In his Letters on Sunspots from 1613, Galileo again considered what hap-
pens when a body on a horizontal plane is put into motion (Galilei 1890,
5:134). He now concluded that since the body is “indifferent” to this motion
(since it is neither natural nor forced), it will conserve its motion in the ab-
sence of all external impediments. (We also know from a letter from his pu-
pil Benedetto Castelli that Galileo already held this view in 1607 [Galilei
1890, 10:170].) While Galileo now presented the conservation as directly
following from the body’s indifference, the earlier indecision in De Motu
Antiquiora shows that this extrapolation cannot have been so straightfor-
ward.
What did happen in the meantime? I will ﬁrst sketch a reconstruction that
is based on all available evidence, but that will also have to ﬁll in quite a fewThis content downloaded from 157.193.149.185 on December 17, 2018 06:50:48 AM
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IDEALIZATION AND GALILEO’S PROTO-INERTIAL PRINCIPLE 925lacunae. This will allow us to see howGalileo’s approach to the problemwas
transformed into one that was in broad agreement with Stevin’s norms on
acceptable idealizations, although it would never be explicated as such by
Galileo himself, for reasons we will consider in section 4.
In 1592, Galileo performed a small experiment, together with his patron
Guidobaldo del Monte (see the convincing evidence gathered in Renn,
Damerow, and Rieger [2000]). They projected a small inked ball on an in-
clined surface, such that the ink would leave a trace marking the path fol-
lowed by the projectile. Their conclusion was that the shape of the trajec-
tory resembled either a parabola or a hyperbola. Renn et al. (2000, 323)
suggest that at this point Galileo could have easily inferred the times-
squared law for freely falling bodies from the parabolic shape, by assuming
the composition of a uniform horizontal motion and an accelerated motion
along the vertical. But there is no evidence that Galileo would have taken
that step around the time of the experiment, and there a few reasons to as-
sume that he probably could not have. As we just saw, the necessary extrap-
olation from the minimal force conclusion to the conservation of motion
(which would result in a uniform motion) was far from straightforward for
Galileo. But even more importantly, as argued conclusively by Renn him-
self, Galileo never came to terms with the right composition of motions char-
acterizing an obliquely projected body (Damerow et al. 2004, 263–66),
which is precisely the case in the experiment with Guidobaldo. It is probably
safest to assume that initially Galileo was interested only in the symmetric
shape of the trajectory (as also stressed in Renn et al. 2000) and that any link
with the law of fall is of a later date.
In 1602, Galileo discussed the relation between motion on inclined
planes and properties of the circular motion of a simple pendulum in a letter
to Guidobaldo del Monte (Galilei 1890, 10:97–100). Two years later, this
time in a letter to Paolo Sarpi, Galileo indicated that he was looking for an ev-
ident axiom from which to derive some phenomena observed by him, among
which was the times-squared law of fall (Galilei 1890, 10:115). It is plausible
to assume a direct link between the content of both letters: in the Discorsi
from 1638 Galileo tried to demonstrate that the circular path of the pendu-
lum is the brachistochrone (the path of quickest descent), starting from the
fact that bodies descending on inclined planes follow the law of fall. After a
careful study of the manuscript evidence, Wisan (1974, 175–79) has sug-
gested that this was probably the way in which Galileo would have started
thinking about the possibility of a mathematical law characterizing acceler-
ation (thus abandoning the idea that the pure phenomenon of fall is charac-
terized by a uniform speed). Looking for a way to prove a proposition with
which a possible demonstration for the brachistochrone could be constructed,
Galileo would have realized that this proof could only be completed if he had
a mathematically determinate way to express distances traversed in terms ofThis content downloaded from 157.193.149.185 on December 17, 2018 06:50:48 AM
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All utimes used. At this point it would have made good sense to try ﬁnd an empir-
ical answer to the question what form this expression should take, by setting
up the famous experiment with inclined planes as described in the Discorsi.
Having found empirically that bodies descending on an inclined plane
approximately follow a times-squared law, the approximately parabolic shape
of the trajectory of a projectile would now have taken on extra meaning. As-
suming the vertical component to be characterized by the precise law of fall,
the mathematics of a parabola immediately implied that the horizontal com-
ponent should be characterized as a motion with uniform velocity. At this
point the question regarding the nature of motion on the horizontal could ﬁ-
nally be answered: it has to be conserved. The clue for the answer did not re-
side in theoretical considerations concerning matter, force, and motion but in
an analysis of the conditions under which an empirical phenomenon could be
mathematically analyzed. (The puzzle regarding oblique projection is not
solved but bypassed. The mathematics demands a uniform horizontal compo-
nent, and Galileo knows how to give this a physical interpretation for the
downward part of the trajectory. This part starts at the moment that the mo-
tion is indeed horizontally oriented, as if the body is on a horizontal plane,
where it can be characterized as “indifferent” to this motion—which will
now be interpreted as implying the conservation of motion that is required
by the mathematics of the curve. For the ﬁrst, upward, part of the trajectory,
Galileo would never do better than appeal to vague symmetry considerations
(see the discussion in Damerow et al. [2004, 263–66]).
While to some extent speculative, this reconstruction has the value that it
brings out the way in which the question concerning the nature of motion on
the horizontal was gradually being transformed into one that could possibly
be adjudicated on empirical grounds by Galileo’s research. Such adjudica-
tion could never have been straightforward, though, since it remains a fact
that in all physically realizable circumstances moving bodies will ﬁnally
come to rest. How can we decide whether this is only due to impediments
rather than also following from the nature of bodies (and motion)? Merely
saying that we can approximate the situation in which the body keeps on
moving is of no avail here, since no matter how good the approximation,
the fact remains that the body stops—which could always be due to its in-
trinsic nature rather than to remaining impediments (this was, e.g., the po-
sition of Roberval later in the seventeenth century; see Roux 2006, 495).
After all, the merely approximately parabolic shape is perfectly consistent
with a nonuniform, slightly decreasing horizontal speed.
The crucial extra step that allowed for the adjudication is the insight that
only the assumption of conservation of motion makes possible a straightfor-
ward mathematical analysis of the empirical phenomena that would other-
wise not have been possible. It allowed Galileo to directly relate the approx-
imately parabolic shape of the trajectory to the approximately quadraticThis content downloaded from 157.193.149.185 on December 17, 2018 06:50:48 AM
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IDEALIZATION AND GALILEO’S PROTO-INERTIAL PRINCIPLE 927relation established on the inclined plane through the idealizing move in
which he assumed both a precise law of fall and a perfect parabola (and note
that for Galileo there would have been no mathematical curve correspond-
ing to a shape closely approximating but not identical with a parabola, so he
would not have been able to mathematically link his observation with the
law of fall without making this idealization). This new possibility provided
Galileo with the good reason to assume the conservation of motion that was
lacking before. This reason was based in empirical facts, but these facts got
their signiﬁcance from the explicit goal of giving a mathematical treatment
of phenomena of motion. Whether the empirical approximation to the ideal
phenomenon was “good enough” thus depended on the fruitfulness of the
further mathematical research program that was predicated on this initial
idealization.
For Stevin the impediments to motion were inseparable attributes be-
cause he did not know any legitimate way to separate a pure phenomenon
of motion from these impediments. Galileo’s research showed that the par-
abolic trajectory of a projectile could be taken to exhibit the nature of neu-
tral motion much in the same way that the balance in indifferent equilibrium
exhibits the mathematical concept of center of gravity. Imagining the mo-
tion of a body on a horizontal plane without impediments had become
strongly constrained by simultaneously empirical and mathematical consid-
erations, in a way that it had not been at the beginning of Galileo’s attempts.
4. A “Proto-Inertial” Principle? All evidence we have of Galileo’s ad-
herence to the idea that horizontal motion is conserved in absence of all im-
pediments dates from after his discovery of the parabolic shape of projectile
motion and of the law of fall. Given the crucial role of conservation in link-
ing both phenomena, it is plausible to assume that this role is exactly what
brought Galileo to accept it after his initial indecision. When arguing for the
validity of his principle, he used a different strategy, though.
In his published writings, Galileo always appealed to the idea that a body
on a horizontal plane is indifferent to motion since any resulting motion
would be neither natural nor forced, and he assumed that this was enough
to claim that this motion would also be conserved in the absence of imped-
iments. Apparently, he felt that he had to present independent reasons to ac-
cept both components making up the parabolic trajectory of a projectile (the
inclined plane experiment for the vertical component and the indifference
argument for the horizontal component), before going on to their composi-
tion. Rather than seeing the parabola as the primary empirical mark left by
the pure phenomenon of neutral motion, he wanted to present the situation
on the horizontal plane as a legitimate exhibition of that phenomenon. But
we already saw that this move is not as evident as Galileo made it out to be,
since it is not clear how he could have unambiguously decided that indif-This content downloaded from 157.193.149.185 on December 17, 2018 06:50:48 AM
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All uference implied conservation without the information provided by the par-
abolic shape.2
It is this same move that explains the main distance separating Galileo’s
principle from our classical inertial principle. The horizontal plane func-
tions as a device that neutralizes the body’s weight so that it becomes indif-
ferent to motion. The absence of a comparable device for the case of oblique
projection is the reason why Galileo cannot apply conservation of motion
there. It is also the reason why the precise nature of the horizontal (rectilinear
or circular) remains underspeciﬁed: the directionality of Galileo’s conserved
motion is not referred to an abstract notion of space that functions as back-
ground, but it is deﬁned with respect to the direction of weight, which can
be considered as either everywhere parallel with itself or converging in a sin-
gle point.
The need for a physical device that neutralizes the body’s weight shows
that for Galileo weight remained what Stevin had called an “inseparable at-
tribute” of all physical bodies, a property that could not be legitimately sub-
tracted from these bodies in an “imaginary operation” (the importance of
this fact was already stressed forcefully in Koyré [1966]). There is a further
story to be told about this conceptualization of bodies, but it is interesting to
point out that Galileo’s results contained everything that was needed to jus-
tify the further idealization in which essentially weightless bodies are pos-
ited to move uniformly and rectilinearly in any arbitrary direction once put
into motion. After all, if the uniformity of horizontal motion was already
based on the parabolic shape of the trajectory of the projectile, why not di-
rectly use the latter to ground this further idealization? This step was implic-
itly taken by Galileo’s pupils Cavalieri and Torricelli, who composed a uni-
form motion in the direction of projection with an accelerated motion caused
by the weight added to the body (see Koyré 1966, 292–304). In this way, the
parabola could become the empirical mark not just of the nature of Galileo’s
neutral motion but of the pure phenomenon of the motion of weightless bod-
ies, that is, something that we can characterize as inertial motion.
Once one has started treating weight as a separable attribute, an external
force modifying the pure phenomenon of motion, the logic behind the jus-2. It is true that after having starting conceptualizing downward motion as naturally ac-
celerated, the step from indifference to conservation has become smaller than it was at
the time of De Motu Antiquiora, when Galileo still saw downward motion as essentially
uniform. Galileo can now claim that a body gains speed if it moves down, and it loses
speed if it moves up. If it moves neither up nor down, there is hence no reason why it
should gain or lose speed, which would imply conservation. This symmetry consider-
ation holds some intuitive appeal, but it prejudges the question whether weight (as mea-
sured by resistance against upward motion) is the only reason why a body would lose a
speed imparted to it. Again, it is not clear how we could ever decide this on purely em-
pirical or theoretical grounds.
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IDEALIZATION AND GALILEO’S PROTO-INERTIAL PRINCIPLE 929tiﬁcation for this idealization has started shifting, though. There can no lon-
ger be the presumption that we could ever encounter a close approximation
of this pure phenomenon in the empirical world, as was still suggested by
Galileo’s device of the horizontal plane. It has rather become a necessary
condition for the successful mathematization of empirical phenomena such
as the shape of projectile motions.REFERENCES
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